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Rents, Knowledge and Neostructuralism: Transforming the Productive 
Matrix in Ecuador 
This paper explores the relationship between ground-rent, production and 
knowledge in Ecuador’s neostructuralist state-led project to transform the 
productive matrix. Based upon insights from the Marxian approach to the critique 
of political economy, we interrogate how neostructuralism has conceptualized the 
relationship between ‘natural resource income’ and ‘knowledge-based’ economic 
development. The paper argues that a rent-theoretical perspective, that takes 
seriously the regional unfolding of uneven geographical development in Latin 
America, can highlight the limits of a national development plan conceived 
according to the logic of Schumpeterian efficiency. In doing so the paper 
identifies the contradictory relationship between natural resource exports, state-
led development and capital accumulation. On this basis the paper offers a 
historically and empirically informed critical analysis of selective import 
substitution industrialisation and vanguard science and technology strategies 
designed to transition Ecuador away from primary resource dependence.  
Keywords: neostructuralism; Ecuador; Marxism; rent, knowledge, Schumpeter, 
uneven development 
One of the countries that emerged relatively quickly from the 2008 global financial 
crisis was Ecuador – a small, dollarized and oil dependent country in Latin America. 
Ecuador lost only 1.3% of GDP and after a year returned to pre-crisis levels of growth.1 
In fact, in the midst of global recession and severe austerity in Europe and the US, in 
2008 the Ecuadorean government of Rafael Correa Delgado embarked upon an 
ambitious economic development plan termed the Transformation of the Productive 
Matrix. The plan is designed to confront the country’s historic dependence upon the 
export of un-processed natural resources, low levels of productivity and technological 
development, high levels of informality and social exclusion and, above all, a structural 
dependence upon foreign exchange earnings from oil exports. Much of the project has 
been inspired by the Economic Commission for Latin America’s (ECLAC) promotion 
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of ‘Structural Change for Equality’, based upon development policies derived from the 
school of economic thinking known as neo-structuralism.2 Specifically, ECLAC has 
provided a contemporary paradigm in which natural resource income can be thought of 
as the bridge towards ‘knowledge-based’ economic development, where a source of 
‘genuine’ productivity (enhancing technical progress) is sought over ‘spurious’ ones’ 
(reduction of wages, exchange rate advantages, exploitation of natural resources). In 
Ecuador this has been translated into a development program in which resource 
extraction has to be intensified in the short term in order to support the aims of 
transitioning to a ‘knowledge-based’ economy in the longer term.3 In 2014, the 
Executive Director of ECLAC, Alicia Barcena, lauded the use of oil revenues to drive 
public investment, exclaiming that Ecuador has ‘taken the bull by the horns and 
managed to diversify its economy.’4  
 This intensification of state-led natural resource exploitation has led some 
scholars to label state intervention as ‘neo-extractivism’ that leads to ecological 
destruction and ultimately the reproduction of the ‘resource curse’.5 In contrast, other 
scholars see the progressive use of natural resource income as the way in which 
‘postneoliberal’ regimes in Latin America can reduce poverty, improve welfare and 
chart their own paths within the global economy.6 Whilst usefully drawing our attention 
to pressing social and ecological concerns and the politics of resource governance, this 
literature has had less to say about the relationship between natural resource rents and 
production.7 As a result it has not adequately dealt with the form taken by new industrial 
and technological development initiatives that have emerged in regimes where ‘neo-
extractivism’ or ‘post-neoliberalism’ are said to operate.  
To fill this gap this paper draws upon the Marxian critique of political economy 
to offer a historically grounded and empirically informed rent-theoretical analysis of the 
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policies designed to transform the productive matrix in Ecuador. We make the case that 
neostructuralism naturalizes both ‘natural resources’ and ‘knowledge’ as factors of 
production, thereby obscuring the social conditions, and global context, under which 
they enter the production process. The problematic upshot is that the revenues, or rents, 
from both are seen to exist in isolation, the former rebuked as an unearned gift of nature 
and the latter celebrated as the product of innovation and entrepreneurship.8 By 
demonstrating that rent is not only a distributive category of economic surplus, but also 
a material relation of production that historically underpins specific and uneven 
processes of capital accumulation, we can account for the emergence and limits of 
development strategies in Ecuador that seek to harness ‘knowledge’ to wealth creation. 
We make this argument in reference to the failure of selective import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) to expand the domestic scale of capital accumulation and the 
contradictions of targeting vanguard science and technology development strategies that 
are materially out of step with the needs and capacity of the domestic economy. The 
former relies upon the ‘intelligent’ targeting of state subsidies towards ‘knowledge-
based’ local-value added production, yet this has been led mainly by small industrial 
capitals with low innovation and productive capacity. Whereas the latter sees 
‘immaterial’ human knowledge as the locus of systematic competitiveness that can be 
realised through the construction of a new ‘City of Knowledge’ called Yachay. 
Although envisioned as a space of innovation and learning that can tap into Ecuador’s 
main comparative advantage – its bio-diversity, the bid to competitively attract global 
bio-tech capital points toward the institutionalisation of private property rights around 
the very ‘knowledge’ that is identified as the route towards an egalitarian modernity. 
The first part of the paper critically situates the developmental reading of natural 
resource income offered by ECLAC and argues that neostructuralism suffers from an 
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under-theorisation of natural resource rents. In the second part of the paper we explain 
the Marxian concept of ground-rent through a value-theoretical lens of uneven 
geographical development in Latin America. Section three draws upon Juan Iñigo 
Carrera’s work on the relationship between ground-rent and capital accumulation in 
Latin America in order to situate Ecuador’s three major primary export booms in 
historical context. In drawing attention to the role of small industrial capitals, we 
account for the specifically restricted form of industrial and technological development 
in Ecuador. Section four puts this approach to work to argue how, and why, the 
neostructuralist policies designed to transform the productive matrix in Ecuador are 
reproducing specifically restricted, rent-dependent, forms of capital accumulation.9 In 
the conclusion we draw the different strands of the argument together to show how our 
rent-theoretical critique can illuminate the contradictory relationship between rents, 
knowledge and production in Ecuador’s TPM.   
Neostructuralism and the resource curse 
Neostructuralism has its intellectual roots in the reforms that ECLAC put in place to 
accommodate the structuralist tradition to a globalized world.10 Although too 
heterogeneous to be called a paradigm, the different strands of neostructuralism have a 
common objective to re-conceptualize the relations between the state, economy and 
society, that is to recouple economic growth with social equity and look for pragmatic 
synergies within globalization that can generate ‘systematic competitiveness’.11 In this 
context ECLAC has modified the structuralist plan for industrialisation based upon 
income from natural resources, which, pace the classic texts of Prebisch and Singer, are 
no longer seen as the cause of deteriorating terms of trade or as a barrier to economic 
diversification.12 Rather, natural resource revenues can stimulate ‘long term 
development if they are used for structural change in a way that creates new 
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comparative advantages derived from knowledge-based activities that do not deplete in 
time and provide growing returns’.13 ‘Knowledge-based’ activities are repeatedly, and 
vaguely, cited as those which are intensive in technology and able to stimulate 
‘Schumpeterian efficiency’, in which rents from innovation drive productivity 
enhancing activities across the economy.14  
For this approach natural resources are neither a curse or a blessing, and nor are 
they to be viewed in neoliberal terms as being equivalent to any other factor of 
production within the logic of comparative advantage.15 Rather, institutions and public 
policies have a role to play in the productive re-allocation of natural resource income, 
but in a way that does not repeat the so-called errors of the first attempt at ISI. This 
conceptualization of structural change on the basis of natural resource income is pitted 
against the now well established ‘resource curse’ literature, which correlates abundant 
natural resources with a variety of social, economic and political ills.16 However, a 
closer inspection of the recent ECLAC literature reveals the reproduction of the 
economic (neoclassical) and governance (public choice theory) tenets of the resource 
curse theories.17 For instance, macroeconomic problems such as the appreciation of the 
exchange rate, the re-allocation of capital to non-tradable sectors and rising costs of 
capital and labour are un-problematically explained with appeal to the ‘Dutch 
Disease’s’ analysis of the effects of windfall revenues.18 As such, the appropriate 
response according to ECLAC should take the form of macroeconomic policies that 
modify relative prices in favour of tradable productive activities, but with a real 
exchange rate that is neither under nor overvalued so as to reflect true ‘systematic 
competitiveness’ within a balanced current account.19 This technical reading, in which 
the state can intervene to control price signals, is also seen as the correct way to re-
orientate patterns of ‘rent seeking’ towards investment in productivity enhancing, 
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´knowledge-based’ activities led by Schumpeterian efficiency.20   
This is symptomatic of ECLAC’s neostructuralism which, according to one 
critic, problematically assumes that the negative consequences of utility maximizing 
agents’ behavior can be corrected by state policy, but in doing so ‘excises fundamental 
analytical categories dealing with power relations that constitute the realm of labour-
capital relations, the increasingly transnationalised circuits of accumulation of capital, 
and the capital accumulation-social reproduction nexus.’21 Therefore, although the 
neostructuralist approach does not strictly share the neoclassical perspective of rents as 
always implying inefficiency in an otherwise perfectly competitive market,22 it does 
assume that resource income distorts the allocation of capital and labour thus requiring 
state intervention to correct market imperfections.23 In fact, very little attempt is made 
to theorise resource income as rents, nor elaborate their relationship with capital 
accumulation or ‘knowledge-based’ activity.24  Rather than an unconscious 
underdevelopment of these concepts this can be identified as the result of ‘systematic 
choices’, especially when we acknowledge that detaching rent theory from its core in 
classical political economy was a defining characteristic of neoclassical economics.25 
This type of reading of resource rents in one-sided in so far as it wrenches ‘the theory of 
rent from its counterpart in the labour theory of value’, and in doing so it severs the link 
between the historical development processes (industrial production and natural 
resource exports) that internally unite the global north and global south.26 In this vein of 
critique, the following section offers a Marxian reading of the global relations between 
rent and production, seen from the perspective of uneven geographical development in 
Latin America.  
 8 
Rents, value and uneven geographical development 
One of the distinguishing historical features of capitalism is that social labour is carried 
out in a private and independent form and that the organization of productive activity is 
achieved through the exchange of commodities.27 It is through the process of exchange 
– mediated by competition among producers in a sector – that the socially necessary 
labour time required to produce a commodity is revealed to individual capitals which, 
post festum, establishes the normal or average method of production within a sector. As 
self-expanding value, based upon the exploitation of labour in production, capital will 
tend to flow to those sectors that offer the highest returns through the formation of the 
general rate of profit.28 This results in the uneven development of the productive forces 
within and across branches of production as capitals struggle to reproduce their social 
existence under the conditions of competition and the demands to produce below or at 
the social average in cost terms.29 This competitive, private and independent process of 
production is spatially expressed through the dialectic of differentiation and 
equalization,30 as the tendential equalization of average rates of profit across different 
branches of global industry takes concrete form in fragmented national processes of 
capital accumulation through the international division of labour.31  
The fragmentation of this process in Latin America has been historically marked 
by territorial subsumption to global capital through the production of agricultural and 
mining commodities for the world market.32 Indeed, under capitalism the appropriation 
of nature occurs for the first time at a world scale and ‘to the degree that natural 
resources are unevenly distributed so a certain kind of uneven geographical 
development results built around conditions of, say, agricultural productivity or the 
presence of oil reserves’.33 This regional insertion of Latin America into the ‘classical’ 
international division of labour played a specific role in the development of global 
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industrial capitalism. By cheapening the means of subsistence and reducing the value of 
labour power in the new industrial centres of the North Atlantic region, the total social 
capital experienced an increase in both labour productivity and the rate of surplus value 
production.34 Yet, in order to gain access to non-renewable natural resources attached to 
such portions of land under conditions of post-independence private ownership, global 
capital had to cede a portion of surplus-value to the landlord classes in Latin America. 
The resulting income for the landowner ‘is known as ground-rent irrespective of 
whether it is paid for agricultural lands, building land, mines, fisheries or forests’.35 In 
this way, although the supply of cheap raw materials increases industrial productivity 
and the rate of global capital accumulation, the portion of surplus value paid as ground-
rent represents a deduction from the total social capital accumulated. This rent-
theoretical perspective can be used to see how the production of both nature and space 
within the global geography of capitalism ‘lies at the heart of uneven development’. 36 
For instance, this analysis implies that ground-rent forms part of the market 
price of primary goods, because in contrast with industrial commodities – whose market 
price is determined by the average conditions of production within a sector – the price 
of primary commodities in the world market is determined by the marginal producer, 
that is, the least fertile lands for which there is solvent demand.37 As a result, capital that 
operates on the most favourable and irreproducible lands will experience higher levels 
of productivity and lower production costs. However, competition among capital to 
access these lands will increase their rental price which permits the landowner to 
capture extraordinary profits – capitalized in the land price as a stream of rents.38 This 
revenue takes the form of differential rent, based upon the monopoly over differential 
natural conditions of production.39 And to the extent that the commodity is consumed 
overseas – such as oil – the surplus value that forms part of the ground rent comes from 
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the workers and capitals purchasing the commodity in the importing countries.40 
This line of argument obviously runs counter to those classic accounts that 
explain ‘the development of underdevelopment’ and ‘dependency’ in Latin America 
through the identification of the flow of surplus-value in the opposite direction, more 
recently re-invoked under the name of ‘imperialist rent’.41 We differ from these 
approaches in that we argue that the process of capitalist development is essentially 
global in content and national only in its form of realization.42 This is relevant because 
it focuses our attention on the fact that the total value that enters into national spheres of 
accumulation in exchange for the export of primary commodities is greater than their 
costs of production (including normal profits):  
‘in connection with differential rent in general, it should be noted that the market 
value is always above the total production price for the overall quantity produced 
… This is determination by a market value brought about by competition that 
produces a false social value.’43 
This means that in their specific determination as a source of cheap raw materials within 
the uneven development of global capitalism, Latin American countries – although to 
differing magnitudes – have historically been constituted by inflows of what Marx 
termed ‘false social value’ as the material basis for a class of landowners.44 Of course, 
these international inflows are not an isolated one-way process as capital has also been 
re-circulated out of Latin America through interest, profit and rents. For example, Latin 
America societies have historically used ground-rent to pay for external public debt 
borrowed at extraordinarily high interest rates; during ISI foreign capital was attracted 
to invest in these national spaces to take advantage of fiscal incentives and the chance to 
valorise obsolete technology in protected internal markets and remit profits abroad; and 
finally, ground-rent was used to pay for access to foreign technology (although outdated 
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in world market terms) protected by licences and patents which permitted a short, but 
rapid, phase of capital intensive industrial growth.45 It is these processes of inflows and 
outflows of capital that can be used to illuminate the dialectical relationship between 
ground-rent, production and ‘knowledge,’ thereby demonstrating how ground-rent 
forms part of the regional unfolding of uneven geographical development in Latin 
America. 
From this perspective the ‘classical’ international division was never simply 
about the polarization of an industrialised ‘core’ and ‘dependent’ periphery, the latter 
restricted to the role of supplier of raw materials and staple foods.46 Rather, there was a 
specific process of accumulation whereby industrial capital within the ‘periphery,’ 
although at a reduced scale, was able to valorize through the appropriation of inflows of 
ground-rent; a process which today also points towards the continuation of elements of 
the ‘classical’ within the ‘new international division of labour’.47 As we develop further 
in the following sections, whereas the former rests firmly on the continued inflows of 
ground-rent and their transfer to domestic markets, the latter has come about as part of 
the expanded global production of relative surplus value through new forms of 
‘knowledge’ intensive large scale industry and the geographical separation of the 
‘mental’ and ‘manual’ along global commodity chains.48 This calls further attention to 
the problematic idea that natural resource revenues, given their external origin and the 
structural constraint they place on the domestic scale of capital accumulation, can be 
used to pursue national forms of ‘systematic competitiveness’ based upon ‘knowledge’ 
led’ industrial upgrading.  
The following section employs this perspective to understand the dynamics and 
effects of the three main historical commodity export booms in Ecuador. This allows us 
to connect past and present windfalls through a rent-theoretical reading that takes 
 12 
seriously the formation of social classes, firms and technology in relation to specific 
processes of capital accumulation.  
Ecuador and the accumulation of capital through the appropriation of 
ground rent 
Ecuador, where primary commodities have historically made up over 90% of exports, is 
a paradigmatic expression of the form of uneven development of capitalism outlined 
above.49 Inflows of differential ground-rent have been a perennial feature of the 
development of Ecuadorean capitalism, marked by three phases in particular where a 
single commodity dominated exports: successively, cacao (1895–1920), banana (1948–
1970), and oil (1972–1983). These inflows consolidated the economic power of a 
financial-commercial-rentier elite composed of a small landlord class, both in their 
original role as agro-exporters and subsequently through their participation in industrial 
capital.50 Although to differing degrees, each phase of resource centred development 
has been marked by the state’s intervention into the inflows of differential rents and 
their concomitant transfer to the rest of the economy which resulted in the establishment 
of specific conditions for the circulation and accumulation of capital in the national 
economy.51  
 During both the cacao and banana booms high international prices, the 
magnitude of exports and inflows of foreign exchange led to the appreciation of the 
national currency and concomitant import booms.52 A national currency is overvalued 
when its capacity to represent social wealth is greater in the domestic than in the world 
market – i.e. than its real purchasing power.53 This overvaluation, which is never an 
automatic effect of windfall but always a state policy,54 forces exporters to sell foreign 
exchange earned in global markets below its value, the loss of a fraction of the export 
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price can be sustained because ‘a surplus profit – ground rent in the case of primary 
commodities – must materialized in the price of the exported goods’55. Subsequently 
this foreign currency can be sold below its value to industrial capital for the import of 
machinery and raw materials, thus indirectly transferring ground rent to the domestic 
economy.56 Equally, the state can use targeted imports taxes to recover a portion of the 
ground-rent from importers benefitting from cheap foreign exchange. Another more 
direct policy through which the state could divert a portion of the rent away from the 
landlord’s pockets and into the state coffers is export taxes.57 Levying specific taxes 
directly on the primary commodity in question allows the state to recover a portion of 
the ground-rent, but not touching the normal profit of capital, from those agro-exporters 
participating in the circulation of these commodities to the world market.58 This 
mechanism, known as export retention, means that ground rent passes directly into the 
hands of the state, which can later be transferred to the domestic economy if the state 
uses this additional social wealth to underwrite subsidies, public lending at negative real 
interest rates, tax exemption and price controls etc.59 It is in this way that import 
substitution strategies are financed, and limited, by the magnitude of ground-rent 
available for appropriation. 
 To different extents these policies were observable during both the cacao and 
banana booms as import and export taxes were used to generate state resources and 
transfer ground-rent to industrial capital.60 However during the cacao period such public 
policies, led by an essentially oligarchic state under the banner of the liberal party, were 
extremely incipient and ground-rent was either remitted abroad in the form of profits to 
English and German stockholders or dedicated to the luxury consumption of landed 
classes with minimal expansion or diversification of the internal market.61 It was during 
the banana period when these policies would take a conscious institutional form through 
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an incipient ISI process. In 1954 the National Board of Planning and Economic 
Coordination was founded which passed the Law of Industrial Promotion in 1957, 
exonerating the import capital goods from taxation along with other considerable tax 
exemptions under the ECLAC doctrine of Raul Prebisch.62 When the state turned to 
policies such as tariff protection, direct state investment, credit at fixed negative rates, 
tax rebates and preferential import licenses manufacturing industry for the internal 
market became the leading growth sector. Yet these same incentives would go on to 
foment a national industrial sector with strong oligopolistic characteristics, as agro-
exporter groups, both from the coast and the Sierra, diversified their holdings into 
protected industry such as textiles, foodstuffs and beverages dominated by small 
capitals, often in partnership with fragments of international capital.63 Unlike normal 
capitals that sell their products in the world, small capitals are those which do not reach 
the scale or level productivity necessary to valorise outside of protected domestic 
spheres.64 
 Industrialisation initiatives were revamped and intensified in the third period of 
oil-financed development, when the main appropriator of ground-rent became the 
Ecuadorean state and the magnitude of differential rents increased dramatically. Indeed, 
the differentia specifica of oil landlord states derive from the materiality of mineral vis-
á-vis agricultural production. As opposed to individual agrarian landowners, whose 
resource commodity is reproducible and temporally dependent upon each production 
cycle, mining landowners ‘can sit on their natural resources’ until the conditions to 
appropriate a larger mass of ground-rent are more favourable.65 Therefore, mining 
landowners, when organised as a class at the world market level in organisations such as 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), will have more bargaining 
power vis-à-vis industrial capital than agrarian ones, making the rents of oil landlord 
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states relatively larger.  This was the fortuitous position that Ecuador found itself when 
two years after joining OPEC as an oil exporter in 1972, oil prices quadrupled creating a 
foreign exchange bonanza ‘that sustained an average GDP growth rate of 6.3% a year 
during 1975–80’ and crucially positioned the state as the dominant monopoly power 
over the appropriation and distribution of ground-rent.66 
By 1974 oil income reached 1.16 USD billion (two thirds of income from 
exports in that year). The state negotiated contracts with oil companies that insured the 
inflow of new resources to undertake infrastructure programs, the expansion of 
education and health as well as generous import substitution policies and agricultural 
modernization.67 Under tariff protection and generous subsidies to import capital goods, 
manufacturing production grew by an annual 10% in activities that were intensive in 
capital and energy and not labour. Unable to compete in the world market, only those 
capitals that open and close their cycle of valorisation within the national economy can 
appropriate ground-rent through these mechanisms, effectively sealing off the domestic 
market.68 This manifested itself in the further proliferation of small industrial capitals 
(some within chains of fragments of large international capitals) that only managed to 
take advantage of the “easy” stage of ISI, that is to say ‘substituting the import of basic 
and non-durable consumer goods without generating higher levels of inter-industrial 
integration towards the production of intermediate goods.69 It is for this reason that 
industrialisation in Ecuador was characterised by obsolete technology, and in today’s 
ECLAC parlance low in knowledge intensity. Therefore, it is here that we can 
historically locate the relationship between ground-rent, production and ‘knowledge’ 
and highlight that the latter is not simply a factor of production, but a social process 
historically and institutionally embedded in uneven and differentiated labour processes, 
firms and forms of technology. 
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Throughout Ecuador’s strongest period of industrial expansion, the dominant 
classes maintained their power intact both in the watering down of any substantial 
agrarian reform and increasing their control over incipient manufacturing sectors.70 
Thus rather than the emergence of the industrial bourgeoisie as an autonomous faction 
of capital, we see the subsumption of industrial manufacturing within the interests of the 
financial-commercial-rentier elite.71 The export of non-ground rent bearing 
commodities (everything except oil, bananas, shrimps and cacao) were negligible for 
the majority of the oil boom period, as industrial capital valorized in the domestic 
market on the back of state mediated ground-rent transfers. The jump in public spending 
was accompanied by a decline in fiscal revenue, provoking deficits in the balance of 
payments which was covered by debt from foreign banks eager to recycle petrodollars 
in the late 1970s.72 As was the case across Latin America, the fall in primary 
commodity prices and a hike in global interest rates in 1979 pushed Ecuador into a 
period of crisis and structural adjustment. 
From the rent-theoretical perspective developed here it is important to note that 
when ground-rent ceased to grow at the pace required to compensate for the difference 
between local and world market levels of productivity, capital accumulation was 
sustained by: the payment of labour-power below its value; inflows of foreign public 
debt; exchange rate devaluation; and the selective protection of industrial sectors such 
as automobiles.73 During the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s, the limited inflow of 
ground-rent saw the contraction of industry and the downsizing of the state as 
privatizations were enacted and wages were pushed down under trade liberalization 
policies. These structural adjustment strategies confined and deepened Ecuador’s 
traditional role as a provider of natural resources throughout the so-called ‘long night’ 
of neoliberal structural adjustment. This was the scenario in which the oil sector was 
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opened to foreign investment and the state reduced its participation, giving up 80% of 
oil royalties to private capital.74 In addition, following the financial crisis of the late 
1990s and the adoption of the dollar as the national currency, the Fund for the 
Stablilisation of Social and Productive Investment and the Reduction of Public Debt 
(FEIRIP) was created which committed 70% of oil revenue to the payment of external 
debt.75 It was only in 2005 during the upswing in global commodity prices that the then 
Finance Minister, Rafael Correa, began reforming the FEIRIP and the state began to re-
assert its control over the recovery of ground-rent.  
Transforming the productive matrix in Ecuador: the political economy of 
neostructuralism 
Commentators agree that from 2006 to 2013 annual growth of 4.2% in Ecuador was 
achieved on the back of a number of conjunctural factors that have signalled a 
deepening of the primary export model.76 Principally Ecuador benefitted from elevated 
international oil prices, as shown by the fact that the government of Rafael Correa 
Delgado (2006-present) received three times the amount of revenue from oil exports 
than any other Ecuadorean government in history. State royalties from the monopoly 
control over oil have been further boosted by new operating contracts (with 99% of 
profits going to the state) and the construction of a new heavy crude pipeline in 2004 
which increased annual output by 53 million barrels.77 Ecuador would also benefit from 
a period of low interest rates in international capital markets and the favourable 
renegotiation of foreign debt, meaning the majority of oil revenues were no longer 
diverted to external liabilities.78 In addition, when the dollar was undervalued on 
international markets between 2007 and 2008, Ecuador benefitted from the rare 
coinciding occurrence of both high prices for natural resource exports and a competitive 
exchange rate (under-valued dollar), permitting both the agro-export elite and the state 
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to appropriate an elevated magnitude of differential rents under a seemingly harmonious 
cycle of economic expansion. 
 This dual rentier political economy can be seen in expanded state spending with 
considerable levels of public and social investment, alongside unprecedented levels of 
wealth concentration amongst the traditional financial-commercial-rentier elite. Similar 
to the processes outlined above, an oligopolistic capitalist class have both fed internal 
demand with expanded imports, but also taken advantage of selective ISI policies for 
domestic production and consumption financed by an oligopolistic banking sector.79 In 
this way traditional elites have managed to benefit from both agrarian exports and 
monopoly control over the internal market, where oil financed state spending has 
increased internal demand and consumption. This led Correa to recognize that ‘we have 
not been able to change the model of accumulation drastically. Before changing it, we 
are basically improving things with the same model of accumulation, because it is not 
our desire to persecute the rich, but it is our intention to have a more just and equal 
society.’80  
 It is in this structural context that we can locate the ‘knowledge-based’ policies 
designed to transform the productive matrix. These can be divided into ‘selective ISI 
strategies’ that aim to increase domestic production and ‘vanguard’ initiatives that take 
their inspiration from the perceived importance of modern science, research and 
technology. The former depicts ‘knowledge-based’ development as the production of 
material goods with some form of local value-added, whereas the latter is based upon a 
vision of ‘immaterial’ human knowledge that can drive future revolutionary industries 
such as biotechnology.81 By taking into account the social conditions under which both 
forms of ‘knowledge’ enter the production process and their relations with the above 
outlined dialectic of inflows and outflows of ground-rent, we can unpack the limits and 
 19 
dynamics of the project to ‘Transform the Productive Matrix’.  
The architects of the transformation of the productive matrix recognise that a 
dependence upon oil revenue, both in terms of volatile prices and resource depletion 
(exhaustion of oil reserves by 2030), is unsustainable for a dollarized economy without 
the capacity to print money or devalue. In 2013 the non-oil trade deficit reached US$9 
billion (9.7% GDP) and the overall trade deficit reached USD$1.088 billion which 
means that, in the main, imports were financed by oil ground-rent. Moreover, 
dollarization means that Ecuador’s de facto national currency is on parity with its 
capacity to represent social wealth as its purchasing power is the same in domestic and 
international markets. Along with tending to incentivize imports,82 and reducing the 
competitiveness of manufacturing exports, this has eliminated the possibility of using 
the overvaluation of the exchange rate as the policy mechanism to transfer ground-rent. 
In the absence of this mechanism to influence relative prices and therefore 
competitiveness, the state turned to sectoral policies to support, finance and protect 
national production.83  
Sectoral policies are organised by the Committee for External Trade (COMEX) 
through an annual resolution designed to substitute imports and protect the production 
of capital goods in the internal market. In 2013, Resolution 116 of COMEX limited 293 
imports through quality control restrictions.84 At the same time the Ministry and 
Industries and Productivity (MIPRO) signed firm based agreements with the objective 
of reducing imports by a value of USD$849 million.85 In 2014 a reported 679 
agreements were signed with 905 companies that generated savings of USD$ 1,726 
million and saw a reduction of USD$163 million in the non-oil trade deficit.86 These 
import substitution and tariff policies offer a de facto currency devaluation by making 
imports more expensive and thereby incentivizing domestic production.87 For example, 
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MIPRO struck specific deals with rubber, ceramics, textile, toys, cosmetics, car parts 
and electrical goods companies for selective import substitution, to avoid the above 
outlined pitfalls of traditional blanket ISI strategies. However, in the context of added 
pressures to safeguard dollarization, it becomes analytically difficult to separate 
initiatives designed to limit the exit of foreign exchange from those genuinely targeted 
at productivity enhancing development. For instance, it has been pointed out that the 
foreign exchange savings of 2013 (USD$ 1.7 billion) were less influenced by import 
substitution than by the high prices reached by the export of shrimps, bananas and 
cacao. And with the fall in primary commodity prices that started in mid-2014 extra 
pressure has been transmitted to the balance of payments, leading to the introduction of 
further tariff barriers designed solely to protect dollarization.88  
These limits can be seen in another initiative to support the manufacturing of 
induction ovens. According to the Correa administration, the incentivized transition to 
new technologically efficient household electric induction cookers will allow the state 
to remove socially regressive gas subsidies which represent an annual cost of USD$1 
billion; renewable energy from new dams will drive down the costs of electricity; and 
the demand for subsidized induction cookers will create value added industrial 
manufacturing (under tariff protection).89 This is a clear example of how ECLCAC´s 
targeted industrial policies were put to work to transfer natural resource income into 
quality job creation based upon productivity enhancing and value added sectors.90 
However, despite subsidies of USD $2.4 million to stimulate consumption, the sectoral 
incentives put in place to stimulate the production of 3.5 million induction ovens by 
2016 have only partially been taken up by Ecuadorean white goods manufacturers. 
Manufacturers complained of late payment of government subsidises for their inability 
to raise levels of production, even though they claimed to have the installed capacity to 
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meet all national demand.91 Nevertheless, in the absence of an increase in national 
supply, in December 2014 the government removed VAT and tariff barriers to the 
import of induction cookers with Correa stating ‘we don’t depend on the will of national 
producers, if they show they want to do it we will stop the imports...they have failed us 
in these months’.92 
Despite this moral and political castigation, such policy failure cannot be 
reduced to the failings of individual capitalists. Rather, we believe, this demonstrates a 
broader underlying limit to selective industrial incentives in Ecuador where capital 
either lacks the scale and productive capacity or has looked to take advantage of 
subsidies in a way that does not require new innovation nor risky investments, relying 
instead upon reproducing ‘easy’ forms of ISI (toys, bicycles, auto-assembly etc.) 
reminiscent of the 1970s.93 This illustrates how small capitals have accumulated capital 
through the appropriation of ground rent (mediated by sectoral policies) in isolation 
from the pressure to innovate and compete in a way that would spread knowledge-based 
‘Schumpeterian efficiency’ across the economy.94 Thus we can see that the model 
endorsed by ECLAC – in which innovation and entrepreneurship are rewarded by 
Schumpeterian rents (essentially above average profits for firms), the competition over 
which drives technological change and social efficiency – is far removed from the 
material dynamics of capital accumulation in Ecuador. Instead, the ‘extra-economic’ 
institutional policies of resource allocation have not led to the creation new 
Schumpeterian rents but are actually the way in which small capitals have accumulated 
capital through the appropriation of ground-rent.  
The limited avenues for selective, but traditional, industrialisation, in part 
explains the paradoxical attractiveness of the ‘vanguard knowledge-based’ economy to 
policy makers. Our primary interviews point to three main justifications: First, given 
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that dollarization restricts and limits the competitiveness of exports, to the extent that a 
small set of primary commodities (oil, bananas, coffee, cacao, and shrimps) are sold on 
the world market, Ecuador must find new products, international market niches and 
forms of innovation for competitive export promotion.95 Second, the creation of new 
‘knowledge-based’ sectors is attractive in terms of human capital updating and the 
investment in so called infinite resources (intellectual labour). Third, creating new 
spaces of research and investigation can attract foreign direct investment (creating new 
sources of foreign exchange), and channel resources into comparative advantages that 
may exist from the country’s biodiversity, but in a way that can create not only primary 
rents but the national value-added processing of new genetic material, drugs etc.  
Heading this strategy is the The Knowledge City Yachay (Yachay: Ciudad del 
Conocimiento), under construction in the rural municipality of San Urcuqui 180 
kilometres north of Quito. Under consultancy guidance from the Korean company 
behind one of the most successful free economic zones (FEZs) in Northeast Asia 
(Incheon Free Economic Zone - IFEZ), Yachay has been denominated the first Special 
Zone of Economic Development (Zona Especial de Desarrollo Económico - ZEDE), a 
delimited tax-free territory with fiscal incentives to strengthen productive investment.96 
A known admirer of the East Asian Tiger’s record of rapid industrialisation, the hiring 
of the IFEZ came out of Correa’s tour of South Korea in 2010 and the government has 
even sought to attract investment by promoting the idea of Ecuador as the ‘Latin 
America Jaguar’.97 The Yachay project started in earnest in May 2012 under the 
initiative of the National Secretary for Higher Education, Science and Technology 
(SENESCYT) and later in partnership with the National Secretary of Planning and 
Development (SENPLADES). In 2013, the public company Yachay EP was created by 
executive decree – with an initial budget reported to be around a billion US dollars – to 
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manage the design and execution of the urban master plan and liberate its management 
from the complexity of state bureaucracy. 98 As Ecuador’s flagship project for hi-tech 
knowledge-based development and the perceived root towards ‘systematic 
competitiveness’, Yachay underpins the government’s (circular) reasoning that 
extractivism (mining and oil exploitation) has to be intensified in the short term in order 
to finance the escape from an extractivist economy. For example, during the 
inauguration of the construction in May 2014, framing the initiative against the 
countries pernicious dependence upon oil, Correa placed special emphasis upon 
technology and innovation and remarked that, “here is being born the new homeland, 
here we are overcoming the extractivist economy in a human and sovereign form”. 
Described as the most important development project in Ecuador’s history Yachay, 
seeks to replicate the ‘triple helix’ design of global science parks and envisions bio-
knowledge as a potential comparative advantage that can create one of the most 
important centres of applied research in the region.99  According the National Plan for 
Buen Vivir,  
Ecuador’s main comparative advantage is its biodiversity and, unquestionably, its 
main competitive advantage would be to acquire the knowledge of the best ways 
to make use of this biodiversity, through its conservation and by building national 
industries related to bio- and nanotechnology.100 
At the centre of the project sits a new publically funded Yachay University, 
designed to be the launchpad for genetic prospecting in the Ecuadorean Amazon and the 
fulcrum of a new world leading pole of scientific research and development. Termed 
‘Republican Bio-Socialism’, according to SENESCYT, this can lead Ecuador to 
…. a different economy, in which science, technology, innovation and knowledge 
permit us to transition from an economy of finite resources – that is to say, the 
production and exportation of natural resources – towards the scientific, economic 
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and industrial appropriation of these resources, to reach an economy of infinite 
resources.  
The hope of policy makers is that a new Code for the Social Economy of Knowledge 
can create a governance framework for intellectual property outside the logic of patents 
and private property, the institutional basis of rents in high-tech industries.101 The chief 
intellectual architect of this vision is the General Secretary of SENESCYT Rene 
Ramirez, who calls for an open and public form of knowledge production through 
‘Great Productive Agreements’ between the state, private sector, academia and civil 
society.102 Railing against the ‘hyper-privatisation’ of knowledge and ‘neo-dependency’ 
on ‘western science’ the state is seen as the arbiter between a ‘plurality of forms of 
property’ to ensure the ‘highest form of democratisation of the benefits and 
opportunities of knowledge’.103  Yet these ideological platitudes for a legislative route 
to an economy of ‘infinite resources’ sit ill at ease with the creation of a free trade zone 
which, according to official promotional documents, seeks to attract global bio-tech 
capital such as Pfizer and AstraZeneca. As is well known, the very business models of 
these companies revolve around the extension and enforcement of intellectual property 
monopolies.104 In this global industry patents function in the same manner as the above 
outlined private monopoly over non-reproducible natural resources, by enclosing 
‘knowledge’ the owner can create artificial scarcity and charge a rent for access to the 
licence, code or genetic material.  
Here we can see the paradox at the root of the hope to exploit their monopoly 
ownership over non-reproducible natural resources (oil and mining) in a way that cross 
subsidises new bio-technology free from the contradictions of rentier capital 
accumulation. What this idealized notion of ‘knowledge-based’ development naively 
underestimates is the extent to which novel forms of intellectual and scientific labor 
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have come about as part of the global intensification of the production of relative 
surplus value and the deepening of ‘knowledge’ and ‘technology’ as central axes of 
accumulation’.105 This has seen global capital relocate production to spaces that offer 
the optimum combination of cost and productivity, and the fact that this global form of 
production has come to be associated with the ‘knowledge economy’ is because, in 
essence, it is the contemporary mode in which capitalist development is driving 
(automation-based) technological change. Moreover, when knowledge intensive code, 
machinery, drugs or genetic material falls under licence and patents they can form a 
stream of rents for the owner of the monopoly over the intellectual property, blocking 
the competitive equalisation of profit rates and, therefore, the long term efficiency 
enhancing impact of Schumpeterian rents.106 
Thus below the shallow discourse, Yachay revolves around a mystification of 
‘knowledge-based’ development as a technical exercise of combining the necessary 
factors of production – labour, capital, knowledge and land (bio-diversity) – in a 
dedicated free trade zone. Such a positivist ‘conception of science, knowledge and 
technological progress’ leads to what Vercellone et al have identified as ‘the abstraction 
of the social relations’ surrounding the control of such powers of production.107 As a 
result, strategies to link research and investigation to the actual productive matrix have 
an extremely embryonic, even incongruous, character; as investment in new Nano and 
Bio technologies currently lack a national industrial fabric with any demand for this 
technology.108 In this context Villavicencio has pointed out that the Schumpeterian logic 
of rent capture, in which new innovation drives economy wide efficiency, bears little 
resemblance to a national economy of small firms that tend to leave and enter the 
market with similar levels of outdated technology.109  
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As of 2016, Yachay EP had not managed to attract any significant investment, 
was embroiled in scandals around the parachuting in of ‘northern’ academics on large 
salaries and, with the precipitous fall in the oil price, was forced to seek a loan of 
US$198 million from The Export Import Bank of China to continue the first phase of 
construction.110 Whilst riding high on the commodities boom Ecuador could rent 
finance ambitious schemes such as Yachay which Correa is loath to abandon, finding 
temporary respite in new debt. This illustrates the volatile dialectic between inflows and 
outflows of capital in the form of ground-rent and interest respectively which have 
historically limited grand development projects across Latin America.  In this context, 
incentivizing foreign investment through the creation of tax-free ‘bio-knowledge 
enclaves’ with limited linkages to the national economy could paradoxically reproduce 
the kind of resource dependent export model of development from which the 
government is trying to escape.111 
Conclusion 
This paper has interrogated the relationship between rents, knowledge and production in 
Ecuador’s state-led project to transform the productive matrix. We showed how an 
economy historically centred on the extraction of ground-rent is marked by, and 
embedded within, specific processes of capital accumulation which limit what can be 
realistically achieved by a state-led turn to a knowledge-based economy. As a result, we 
argued that ‘knowledge’ has fallen prey to the same under-theorization as its discursive 
opposite – ‘natural resources’. By analytically identifying the social origins of rent, the 
paper highlighted how the export of natural resources and inflows of differential rents 
form part of the regional unfolding uneven geographical development in Latin America. 
Applying this to the historical development of capitalism in Ecuador we showed how 
transfers of ground-rent were historically mediated by a combination of state policies 
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that protect and incentivize small capitals but, in doing so, create a structural 
dependence upon the magnitude of ground-rent available for appropriation.  
Using this analysis to understand Ecuador’s current policies to pursue 
‘knowledge-based’ strategies, we were able to show that natural resource income and 
knowledge are not simply technical inputs, but historically and institutionally embedded 
in uneven and differentiated labour processes, firms and forms of technology. As such, 
the division between selective ISI and vanguard ‘knowledge-based’ strategies were 
shown to be the policy expression of neostructuralism’s under-theorisation of rents. The 
former strategies were shown to reproduce easy forms of ISI, allowing small industrial 
capitals to accumulate through the appropriation of ground-rent in isolation from the 
kind of technological innovation that ostensibly leads to ‘Schumpeterian efficiency’. In 
contrast, the latter strategies represented an abstraction from the social relations of 
production in Ecuador, as ‘knowledge-based’ development has been conceptualized as 
the functional outcome of taking advantage of immense bio-diversity through 
subsidized research, development and innovation. Perhaps most gravely, in the absence 
of national capitals linked to this state-led project (as occurred in other regions of rapid 
industrial development and technological updating, such as South East Asia), this 
potentially points towards outflows of ground-rent and natural resources through 
subsidized bio-knowledge enclaves to attract international capital as a competition 
strategy within the new international division of labour. 
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